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Abstract
Some of the recent blockchain proposals, such as Stellar and Ripple, allow for open membership while
using quorum-like structures typical for classical Byzantine consensus with closed membership. This
is achieved by constructing quorums in a decentralised way: each participant independently chooses
whom to trust, and quorums arise from these individual decisions. Unfortunately, the consensus
protocols underlying such blockchains are poorly understood, and their correctness has not been
rigorously investigated. In this paper we rigorously prove correct the Stellar Consensus Protocol
(SCP), with our proof giving insights into the protocol structure and its use of lower-level abstractions.
To this end, we first propose an abstract version of SCP that uses as a black box Stellar’s federated
voting primitive (analogous to reliable Byzantine broadcast), previously investigated by García-Pérez
and Gotsman [7]. The abstract consensus protocol highlights a modular structure in Stellar and can
be proved correct by reusing the previous results on federated voting. However, it is unsuited for
realistic implementations, since its processes maintain infinite state. We thus establish a refinement
between the abstract protocol and the concrete SCP that uses only finite state, thereby carrying over
the result about the correctness of former to the latter. Our results help establish the theoretical
foundations of decentralised blockchains like Stellar and gain confidence in their correctness.
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1 Introduction
Permissioned blockchains are becoming increasingly popular due to the low-energy consump-
tion and hard guarantees they provide on when a transaction can be considered successfully
committed. Such blockchains are often based on classical Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)
consensus protocols, like PBFT [4]. In these protocols consensus is reached once a quorum
of participants agrees on the same decision. Quorums can be defined as sets containing
enough nodes in the system (e.g., 2f + 1 out of 3f + 1, assuming at most f failures) or by a
more general structure of a Byzantine quorum system (BQS) [12]. Unfortunately, defining
quorums in this way requires fixing the number of participants in the system, which prevents
decentralisation.
Some of the recent blockchain proposals, such as Stellar [13] and Ripple [15], allow for
open membership while using quorum-like structures typical for classical Byzantine consensus
with closed membership. This is achieved by constructing quorums in a decentralised way:
each protocol participant independently chooses whom to trust, and quorums arise from
these individual decisions. In particular, in Stellar trust assumptions are specified using a
federated Byzantine quorum system (FBQS), where each participant selects a set of quorum
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slices – sets of nodes each of which would convince the participant to accept the validity
of a given statement (§2). Quorums are defined as sets of nodes U such that each node
in U has some quorum slice fully within U , so that the nodes in a quorum can potentially
reach an agreement. Consensus is then implemented by a fairly intricate protocol whose key
component is federated voting – a protocol similar to Bracha’s protocol for reliable Byzantine
broadcast [1, 2]. Unfortunately, even though Stellar has been deployed as a functioning
blockchain, the structure of the consensus protocol underlying it is poorly understood and
its correctness has not been rigorously investigated. In this paper we aim to close this gap,
rigorously defining and proving correct the Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP). Apart from
giving more confidence in the correctness of the protocol, our proof is structured in such a
way as to give insights into its structure and its use of lower-level abstractions.
In more detail, the guarantees provided by SCP are nontrivial. When different participants
in an FBQS choose different slices, only a subset of the participants may take part in a
subsystem in which every two quorums intersect in a correct node – a property required for
achieving consensus. The system may partition into such subsystems, and SCP will guarantee
agreement within each of them. In blockchain terms, the blockchain may fork, but in this
case each fork will be internally consistent, a property that is enough for business applications
of the Stellar blockchain. The subsystems where agreement is guaranteed are characterised
by Mazières et al. [14] through the notion of intact sets. Our proof of correctness establishes
safety and liveness properties of SCP relative to such intact sets (§3).
As a stepping stone in the proof, we first propose an abstract version of SCP that uses as
a black box Stellar’s federated voting primitive (analogous to reliable Byzantine broadcast)
previously investigated by García-Pérez and Gotsman [7] (§5). This abstract formulation
allows specifying the protocol concisely and highlights the modular structure present in
it. This allows proving the protocol by reusing the previous results on federated voting [7]
(reviewed in §4). However, the abstract protocol is unsuited for realistic implementations,
since its processes maintain infinite state. To address this, we formulate a realistic version
of the protocol – a concrete SCP – that uses only finite state. We then prove a refinement
between the abstract and concrete SCP, thereby carrying over the result about the correctness
of former to the latter (§6).
A subtlety in SCP is that its participants receive information about quorum slices of
other participants directly from them. Hence, Byzantine participants may lie to others about
their choices of quorum slices, which may cause different participants to disagree on what
constitutes a quorum. Our results also cover this realistic case (§7).
Overall, our results help establish the theoretical foundations of decentralised blockchains
like Stellar and gain confidence in their correctness. Due to space constraints, proofs are
deferred to an extended version of the paper [8].
2 Background: System Model and Federated Byzantine Quorum
Systems
System model. We consider a system consisting of a finite universe of nodes V and
assume a Byzantine failure model where faulty nodes can deviate arbitrarily from their
specification. All other nodes are called correct. Nodes that are correct, or that only deviate
from their specification by stopping execution, are called honest. Nodes that deviate from
their specification in ways other than stopping are called malicious. We assume that any two
nodes can communicate over an authenticated perfect link. We assume a partial synchronous
network, which guarantees that messages arrive within bounded time after some unknown,
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finite global stabilisation time (GST ). Each node has a local timer and a timeout service that
can be initialised with an arbitrary delay ∆. We assume that after GST the clock skew of
correct nodes is bounded, i.e., after GST two correct nodes can only disagree in the duration
of a given delay ∆ by a bounded margin.
Federated Byzantine quorum systems. Given a finite universe V of nodes, a federated
Byzantine quorum system (FBQS) [13, 7] is a function S : V → 22V \ {∅} that specifies a
non-empty set of quorum slices for each node, ranged over by q. We require that a node
belongs to all of its own quorum slices: ∀v ∈ V.∀q ∈ S(v). v ∈ q. Quorum slices reflect the
trust choices of each node. A non-empty set of nodes U ⊆ V is a quorum in an FBQS S iff
U contains a slice for each member, i.e., ∀v ∈ U.∃q ∈ S(v). q ⊆ U .
For simplicity, for now we assume that faulty nodes do not equivocate about their quorum
slices, so that all the nodes share the same FBQS. In §7 we consider the more realistic
subjective FBQS [7], where malicious nodes may lie about their slices and different nodes
have different views on the FBQS. There we also lift the results on the subsequent sections
of the paper to subjective FBQSes.
I Example 1. Consider a universe V with 3f + 1 nodes, and consider the FBQS S where
for every node v ∈ V, the set of slices S(v) consists of every set of 2f + 1 nodes that contains
v itself. S encodes the classical cardinality-based quorum system of 3f + 1 nodes with failure
threshold f , since every set of 2f + 1 or more nodes is a quorum.
I Example 2. Let the universe V contain four nodes v1 to v4, and consider the FBQS S in
the diagram below.
v1
v2
v3
v4
S(v1) = {{v1, v2}}
S(v2) = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}}
S(v3) = {{v3}}
S(v4) = {{v4}}
For each node, all the outgoing arrows with the same style determine one slice. Node v2 has
two slices, determined by the solid and dashed arrow styles respectively. The rest of the
nodes have one slice. S has the following set of quorums Q =
{{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3}, {v4}, {v1, v2, v3}, {v3, v4}, {v1, v2, v4}, {v2, v3, v4}, {v1, v2, v3, v4}}.
A consensus protocol that runs on top of an FBQS may not guarantee global agreement,
because when nodes choose slices independently, only a subset of the nodes may take part
in a subsystem in which every two quorums intersect in at least one correct node – a basic
requirement of a Byzantine quorum system [12] to ensure agreement. To formalise which
parts of the system may reach agreement internally, we borrow the notions of intertwined
nodes and of intact set from [14]. Two nodes v1 and v2 are intertwined iff they are correct
and every quorum containing v1 intersects every quorum containing v2 in at least one correct
node. Consider an FBQS S and a set of nodes I. The projection S|I of S to I is the FBQS
over universe I given by S|I(v) = {q ∩ I | q ∈ S(v)}. For a given set of faulty nodes, a set I
is an intact set iff I is a quorum in S and every member of I is intertwined with each other
in the projected FBQS S|I . The intact sets characterise those sets of nodes that can reach
consensus, which we later show using the following auxiliary result.
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I Lemma 3. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact set
in S and consider any two quorums U1 and U2 in S such that U1 ∩ I 6= ∅ and U2 ∩ I 6= ∅.
Then the intersection U1 ∩ U2 contains some node in I.
The maximal intact sets are disjoint with each other:
I Lemma 4. Let S be an FBQS and assume some set of faulty nodes. Let I1 and I2 be two
intact sets in S. If I1 ∩ I2 6= ∅ then I1 ∪ I2 is an intact set in S.
In SCP the system may split into different partitions – i.e., the maximal intact sets – that
may be inconsistent with each other, but which constitute independent systems each of which
can reach consensus.
Consider the S from Example 1, which encodes the cardinality-based quorum system
of 3f + 1 nodes, and let f = 1, so that the universe V contains four nodes v1 to v4. If we
assume that node v3 is faulty, then the set I = {v1, v2, v4} is the only maximal intact set:
I is a quorum in S, and S|I contains the quorums {{v1, v2}, {v2, v4}, {v1, v4}, {v1, v2, v4}},
which enjoy quorum intersection. This ensures that every two nodes in I are intertwined in
the projected system S|I .
Now consider the S from Example 2. If we assume that node v3 is faulty, then the sets
I = {v1, v2} and I ′ = {v4} are the maximal intact sets: I and I ′ are quorums in S, and the
projected systems S|I and S|I′ enjoy quorum intersection – SI contains quorums {v1, v2}
and {v2}, and S|I′ contains quorum {v4} – which ensures that every two nodes in either I
or I ′ are intertwined in the projected systems S|I and SI′ respectively. It is easy to check
that adding any set of correct nodes to either I or I ′ results in sets that are not quorums in
S, or in projected systems that contain some pairs of nodes that are not intertwined.
3 Specifications
Assume a set Val of consensus values. In the consensus protocols that we study in §5–6,
each correct node proposes some x ∈ Val through an invocation propose(x), and each node
may decide some x′ ∈ Val through an indication decide(x′). We consider a variant of the
weak Byzantine consensus specification in [2] that we call non-blocking Byzantine consensus
for intact sets, which is defined as follows. Given a maximal intact set I,
(Integrity) no correct node decides twice,
(Agreement for intact sets) no two nodes in I decide differently,
(Weak validity for intact sets) if all nodes are honest and every node proposes x, then no
node in I decides a consensus value different from x; furthermore, if all nodes are honest
and some node in I decides x, then x was proposed by some node, and
(Non-blocking for intact sets) if a node v in I has not yet decided in some run of the protocol,
then for every continuation of that run in which all the malicious nodes stop, node v
eventually decides some consensus value.
The usual Weak validity property of consensus [2] ensures that if all nodes are correct and
they propose the same consensus value, then no node can decide a consensus value different
from the proposed one; and that if all nodes are correct, then a node can only decide a
consensus value proposed by some node. Our Weak validity for intact sets above adapts this
requirement to the nodes in a maximal intact set, and weakens its condition by assuming
that all nodes are honest instead of correct. Notice that if every two quorums intersect our
property entails the usual one because a correct node is also honest, and because if all nodes
are correct then the maximal intact set is the universe. For instance, this condition holds in
the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f + 1).
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The consensus protocols we consider in this paper specify the behaviour of SCP’s ballot
protocol [13, 14] with one of its suggested strategies for managing timeouts (Strategy 1
from [14]). As discussed in [14], in SCP malicious nodes with good network timing could
permanently delay the termination of the nodes in an intact set, and thus the protocol does
not provide the usual Termination guarantee that every correct node eventually decides
some consensus value [2]. Instead, we consider the weaker liveness guarantee of Non-blocking
for intact sets, which we have obtained by adapting the Non-blocking property in [16].
Non-blocking requires that some continuation of a given run exists in which every correct
node terminates. Our Non-blocking for intact sets adapts this requirement to the nodes in
a maximal intact set, and requires that they terminate in every continuation of the run in
which malicious nodes are stopped. It is easy to check that if every correct node is in an
intact set, then Non-blocking for intact sets entails Non-blocking in [16]. For instance, this
condition holds in the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f + 1). Besides, if every correct
node is honest, then Non-blocking for intact sets entails the usual Termination property that
guarantees that every correct node eventually decides some consensus value.
The non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets above entails the weak Byzantine
consensus specification [2] in the cardinality-based quorum systems (3f+1), which guarantees
the Integrity property above, as well as the usual Agreement property that ensures that no
two correct nodes decide differently, and the usual Weak validity and Termination properties
that we have recalled in the paragraphs above.
One of the core components of the consensus protocol in §5 is federating voting (FV )
[13, 14]. Assume a set of voting values A that could be disjoint with the set Val of consensus
values (we typically let A be the set of Booleans Bool ≡ {true, false}). FV allows each
correct node to vote for some a ∈ A through an invocation vote(a), and each node may
deliver some a′ ∈ A through an indication deliver(a′). The interface of FV is akin to that
of consensus, where each node activates itself through the primitive vote(a). However, FV
has weaker liveness guarantees than consensus, which are reminiscent to those of Byzantine
reliable broadcast from [2] and weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast from [7]. Here, we consider
a variant of the latter specification that we call reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets,
which is defined as follows. Given a maximal intact set I,
(No duplication) every correct node delivers at most one voting value,
(Totality for intact sets) if a node in I delivers a voting value, then every node in I eventually
delivers a voting value,
(Consistency for intertwined nodes) if two intertwined nodes v and v′ deliver a and a′ re-
spectively, then a = a′, and
(Validity for intact sets) if all nodes in I vote for a, then all nodes in I eventually deliver a.
The ability of each node to activate itself independently in the specification above simulates
a malicious sender that may send different voting values to each node in the specification of
weakly reliable Byzantine broadcast from [7].
4 Federated Voting
In this section we recall federated voting (FV ) from [13], which also corresponds to the
Stellar broadcast considered in [7]. We prove that FV implements the specification of reliable
Byzantine voting for intact sets, thereby generalising the results of [7] to the case of multiple
intact sets within the system. The consensus protocol that we study in the next section uses
multiple instances of FV independent from each other. This is done by letting each node run
a distinct process for each instance of FV, which is identified by a tag t from some designated
set Tag of tags.
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Algorithm 1 below depicts FV over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q. A node v runs a
process federated-voting(v, t) for each tag t. The messages exchanged by such a process are
also tagged with t, in order to distinguish them from the messages exchanged for instances
of FV associated with tags different from t.
Algorithm 1 Federated voting (FV) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process federated-voting(v ∈ V, t ∈ Tag)
2 voted, ready, delivered← false ∈ Bool;
3 vote(a)
4 if not voted then
5 voted← true;
6 send VOTE(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
7 when received VOTE(t, a) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and not ready
8 ready← true;
9 send READY(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
10 when received READY(t, a) from every u ∈ B for some v-blocking B and
not ready
11 ready← true;
12 send READY(t, a) to every v′ ∈ V;
13 when received READY(t, a) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and not delivered
14 delivered← true;
15 trigger deliver(a);
FV adapts Bracha’s protocol for reliable Byzantine broadcast [1], which works over the
cardinality-based quorum systems of 3f + 1 nodes, to the federated setting of the FBQSs. In
FV nodes process each other’s messages in several stages, where for each tag t progress is
denoted by several Boolean flags (line 2 of Algorithm 1). When a node v votes a for tag t
for the first time, the node sends VOTE(t, a) to every node (including itself, for uniformity;
lines 3–6). When a node v receives a VOTE(t, a) message from a quorum to which v itself
belongs, it sends a READY(t, a) message to every node, signalling its willingness to deliver the
value a for tag t (lines 7–9). Note that, for each tag t, two nodes in the same intact set I
cannot send READY messages with two different voting values through the rule in lines 7–9.
Indeed, this would require two quorums of VOTE messages, each with a node in I, with
different voting values for the same tag. But by Lemma 3 these quorums would intersect in
a node in I, which is by definition correct and cannot send contradictory VOTE messages for
the same tag. When a node v receives the message READY(t, a) from a quorum to which v
itself belongs, it delivers a for tag t (lines 13–15).
The exchange of READY messages in the protocol is necessary to establish liveness guar-
antees. It ensures that, if a node in an intact set I delivers a voting value for some tag,
other nodes in I have enough information to also deliver a voting value for the same tag.
This relies on the rule in lines 10–12, which uses the notion of v-blocking set [13]. Given a
node v, a set B is v-blocking iff B overlaps each of v’s slices, i.e., ∀q ∈ S(v). q ∩B 6= ∅. (To
illustrate this notion, in Example 1 every set of f + 1 nodes is v-blocking for every v, and in
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Node v1 Node v2 Node v3 Node v4
vote(false) vote(false) vote(true)
VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, false) VOTE(t, true)
READY(t, false) READY(t, false)
READY(t, false)
deliver(false) deliver(false) deliver(false)
Figure 1 Execution of the instance of FV for tag t.
Example 2 the set {v1, v3} is v2-blocking and the set {v2} is v1-blocking.) Lines 10–12 allow
a node to send a READY(t, a) message even if it previously voted for a different voting value
for tag t: this is done if v receives READY(t, a) from each member of a v-blocking set. If v is
in an intact set I, the following lemma guarantees that in this case v has received at least
one READY(t, a) message from some node in I.
I Lemma 5. Let S be an FBQS and assume a set of faulty nodes. Let I be an intact set in
S and v ∈ I. Then, no v-blocking set B exists such that B ∩ I = ∅.
By Lemma 5, the first node in I to ever send a READY(t, a) message for a tag t has to do it
through the rule in lines 7–9, and hence the value a has been cross-checked by a quorum.
If the condition v ∈ U in lines 7 and 13 of Algorithm 1 was dropped, this could violate
Agreement for intact sets as follows. Take the S from Example 2 and consider a run of FV for
some tag t where v3 is malicious. Node v3 could respectively send READY(t, a) and READY(t, a′)
with a 6= a′ to correct nodes v1 and v2. Since {v3} ∈ Q, these nodes will respectively deliver
a and a′ by lines 13–15 of Algorithm 1 without condition v ∈ U .
Our first contribution is to generalise the results of [7] to establish the correctness of FV
within each of the maximal intact sets of an FBQS, as captured by Theorem 6 below.
I Theorem 6. Let S be an FBQS and t be a tag. The instance for t of FV over S satisfies
the specification of reliable Byzantine voting for intact sets.
FV also guarantees the property stated by the following lemma, which helps establish
the liveness properties of the consensus protocol that we introduce in §5.
I Lemma 7. Let S be an FBQS and t be a tag. Consider an execution of the instance for t
of FV over S. Let I be an intact set in S and assume that GST has expired. If a node v ∈ I
delivers a voting value then every node in I will deliver a voting value within bounded time.
We write δI for the time that a node in I takes to deliver some voting value after GST and
provided that some other node in I already delivered some voting value. The delay δI –
which is determined by S and I – is unknown, but Lemma 7 guarantees that it is finite.
I Example 8. Consider the S from Example 1, which encodes the cardinality-based quorum
system 3f + 1, and let f = 1 such that the universe V contains four nodes v1 to v4. Every
set of three or more nodes is a quorum, and every set of two or more nodes is v-blocking
for every v ∈ V. Let us fix a tag t and consider an execution of the instance of FV for tag
t where we let the voting values be the Booleans. Assume that nodes v1, v2 and v4 are
correct, which constitute the maximal intact set. In the execution, nodes v1 and v2 vote
false, and node v4 votes true. Malicious node v3 sends the message VOTE(t, false) to every
node (highlighted in red) thus helping the correct nodes to deliver false.
Figure 1 depicts a possible execution of FV described above, from which a trace can be
constructed as follows: all the events in each row may happen concurrently, and any two events
in different rows happen in real time, where time increases downwards; in those cells that are
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tagged with a message, the node sends the message to every node, and in a given cell a node
has received all the messages from every node in the rows above it. (These conventions are
only for presentational purposes, and should not be mistaken with the perfectly synchronised
round-based model of [5], which we do not use.) The quorum {v1, v2, v3} sends VOTE(t, false)
to every node, which makes nodes v1 and v2 send READY(t, false) to every node through
lines 7–9 of Algorithm 1. However, there exists not a quorum U such that v4 ∈ U and every
member of U sends a message VOTE(t, a) with the same Boolean a, and thus node v4 sends
READY(t, false) through lines 10–12 of Algorithm 1, only after receiving corresponding ready
messages from the v4-blocking set {v1, v2}. Observe how node v4 changes its original vote
true and sends false in the READY message. After every correct node receives READY(t, false)
from the quorum {v1, v2, v4}, they all deliver false.
5 Abstract Stellar Consensus Protocol
In this section we introduce the abstract SCP (ASCP), which concisely specifies the mechanism
of SCP [13, 14] and highlights the modular structure present in it1. Like Paxos [9], ASCP
uses ballots – pairs 〈n, x〉, where n ∈ N+ a natural positive round number and x ∈ Val a
consensus value. We assume that Val is totally ordered, and we consider a special null ballot
〈0,⊥〉 and let Ballot = (N+ ×Val) ∪ {〈0,⊥〉} be the set of ballots. (We write b.n and b.x
respectively for the round and consensus value of ballot b.) The set Ballot is totally ordered,
where we let b < b′ iff either b.n < b′.n, or b.n = b′.n and b.x < b′.x.
To better convey SCP’s mechanism, we let the abstract protocol use FV as a black box
where nodes may hold a binary vote on each of the ballots: we let the set of voting values V
be the set of Booleans and the set of tags Tag be the set of ballots, and let the protocol
consider a separate instance of FV for each ballot. A node voting for a Boolean a for a
ballot b that carries the consensus value b.x encodes the aim to either abort the ballot (when
a = false) or to commit it (when a = true) thus deciding the consensus value b.x. From now
on we will unambiguously use “Booleans”, “ballots” and “values” instead of “voting values”,
“tags” and “consensus values”, respectively.
We have dubbed ASCP “abstract” because, although it specifies the protocol concisely, it
is unsuited for realistic implementations. On the one hand, each node v maintains infinite
state, because it stores a process federated-voting(v, b) for each of the infinitely many ballots b
in the array ballots (line 2 of Algorithm 2). On the other hand, each node v may need to
send or receive an infinite number of messages in order to progress (lines 6, 8, 15 and 21 of
Algorithm 2, which are explained in the detailed description of ASCP below). This is done by
assuming a batched network semantics (BNS) in which the network exchanges batches, which
are (possibly infinite) sequences of messages, instead of exchanging individual messages: the
sequence of messages to be sent by a node when processing an event is batched per recipient,
and each batch is sent at once after the atomic processing of the event; once a batch is
received, the recipient node atomically processes all the messages in the batch in sequential
order. By convention, we let the statement forall in lines 7 and 21 of Algorithm 2 consider
the ballots b′ in ascending ballot order. In §6 we introduce a “concrete” version of SCP that
is amenable to implementation, since nodes in it maintain finite state and exchange a finite
number of messages; however, this version does not use FV as a black box.
1 More precisely, in this paper we focus on Stellar’s core balloting protocol, which aims to achieve consensus.
We abstract from Stellar’s nomination protocol – which tries to converge (best-effort) on a value to
propose – by assuming arbitrary proposals to consensus.
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Algorithm 2 Abstract SCP (ASCP) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process abstract-consensus(v ∈ V)
2 ballots← [new process federated-voting(v, b)]b∈Ballot;
3 candidate, prepared← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
4 round← 0 ∈ N+ ∪ {0};
5 propose(x)
6 candidate← 〈1, x〉;
7 for all b′  candidate do ballots[b′].vote(false);
8 when triggered ballots[b′].deliver(false) for every b′  b and prepared < b
9 prepared← b;
10 if candidate ≤ prepared then
11 candidate← prepared;
12 ballots[candidate].vote(true);
13 when triggered ballots[b].deliver(true)
14 trigger decide(b.x);
15 when exists U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U and for each u ∈ U exist
Mu ∈ {VOTE, READY} and bu ∈ Ballot such that round < bu.n and either
received Mu(bu, true) from u or received Mu(b′, false) from u for every
b′ ∈ [zu, bu) with zu < bu
16 round← min{bu.n | u ∈ U};
17 start-timer(F (round));
18 when triggered timeout
19 if prepared = 〈0,⊥〉 then candidate← 〈round + 1, candidate.x〉;
20 else candidate← 〈round + 1, prepared.x〉;
21 for all b′  candidate do ballots[b′].vote(false);
ASCP uses the following below-and-incompatible-than relation on ballots. We say ballots b
and b′ are compatible (written b ∼ b′) iff b.x = b′.x, and incompatible (written b 6∼ b′)
otherwise, where we let ⊥ 6= x for any x ∈ Val. We say ballot b is below and incompatible
than ballot b′ (written b  b′) iff b < b′ and b 6∼ b′. In a nutshell, ASCP works as follows:
each node uses FV to prepare a ballot b which carries the candidate value b.x, this is, it
aborts every ballot b′  b, which prevents any attempt to decide a value different from b.x at
a round smaller than b.n; once b is prepared, the node uses FV again to commit ballot b,
thus deciding the candidate value b.x.
ASCP is depicted in Algorithm 2 above. We assume that each node v creates a process
federated-voting(v, b) for each ballot b, which is stored in the infinite array ballots[b] (line 2).
The node keeps fields candidate and prepared, which respectively contain the ballot that v is
trying to commit and the highest ballot prepared so far. Both candidate and prepared are
initialised to the null ballot (line 3). The node also keeps a field round that contains the
current round, initialised to 0 (line 4). Once v proposes a value x, the node assigns the
ballot 〈1, x〉 to candidate and tries to prepare it by invoking FV’s primitive vote(false) for
each ballot below and incompatible than candidate (lines 5–7). This may involve sending an
infinite number of messages, which by BNS requires sending finitely many batches. Once v
OPODIS 2019
5:10 Deconstructing Stellar Consensus
prepares some ballot b by receiving FV’s indication deliver(false) for every ballot below and
incompatible than b, and if b exceeds prepared, the node updates prepared to b (lines 8–9).
The condition in line 8 may concern an infinite number of ballots, but it may hold after
receiving a finite number of batches by BNS. If prepared reaches or exceeds candidate, then
the node updates candidate to prepared, and tries to commit it by voting true for that ballot
(lines 10–12). Once v commits some ballot b by receiving FV’s indication deliver(true) for
ballot b, the node decides the value b.x (lines 13–14) and stops execution.
If the candidate ballot of a node v can no longer be aborted nor committed, then v
resorts to a timeout mechanism that we describe next. The primitive start-timer(∆) starts
the node’s local timer, such that a timeout event will be triggered once the specified delay ∆
has expired. (Invoking start-timer(∆′) while the timer is already running has the effect of
restarting the timer with the new delay ∆′.) In order to start the timer, a node v needs to
receive, from each member of a quorum that contains v itself, messages that endorse either
committing or preparing ballots with rounds bigger than round (line 15 of Algorithm 2).
Since the domain of values can be infinite, the condition in line 15 requires that for each node
u in some quorum U that contains v itself, there exists a ballot bu with round bu.n > round,
and either v receives from u a message endorsing to commit bu, or otherwise v receives
from u messages endorsing to abort every ballot in some non-empty, right-open interval
[zu, bu), whose upper bound is bu. This condition may require receiving an infinite number
of ballots, but it may hold after receiving a finite number of batches by BNS. Once the
condition in line 15 holds, the node updates round to the smallest n such that every member
of the quorum endorses to either commit or prepare some ballot with round bigger or equal
than n, and (re-)starts the timer with delay F (round), where F is an unbound function that
doubles its value with each increment of n (lines 16–17). If the candidate ballot can no
longer be aborted or committed, then timeout will be eventually triggered (line 18) and the
node considers a new candidate ballot with the current round increased by one, and with the
value candidate.x if the node never prepared any ballot yet (line 19) or the value prepared.x
otherwise (line 20). Then v tries to prepare the new candidate ballot by voting false for each
ballot below and incompatible than it (line 21). This may involve sending an infinite number
of messages, which by BNS requires sending finitely many batches.
The condition for starting the timer in line 15 does not strictly use FV as a black box.
However, this use is warranted because line 15 only “reads” the state of the network. ASCP
makes every other change to the network through FV’s primitives.
ASCP guarantees the safety properties of non-blocking Byzantine consensus in §3. Since
a node stops execution after deciding some value, Integrity for intact sets holds trivially. The
requirement in lines 8–12 of Algorithm 2 that a node prepares the candidate ballot before
voting for committing it, enforces that if a voting for committing some ballot within the
nodes of an intact set I succeeds, then some node in I previously prepared that ballot:
I Lemma 9. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I be an
intact set in S. If a node v1 ∈ I commits a ballot b, then some node v2 ∈ I prepared b.
Aborting every ballot below and incompatible than the candidate one prevents that one
node in an intact set I prepares a ballot b1, and concurrently another node in I sends
READY(b2, true) with b2 below and incompatible than b1:
I Lemma 10. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I
be an intact set in S. Let v1 and v2 be nodes in I and b1 and b2 be ballots such that
b2  b1. The following two things cannot both happen: node v1 prepares b1 and node v2 sends
READY(b2, true).
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Agreement for intact sets holds as follows: assume towards a contradiction that two nodes
in I respectively commit ballots b1 and b2 with different values. A node in I prepared the
bigger of the two ballots by Lemma 9, which results in a contradiction by Lemma 10.
Lemma 11 below ensures that in line 20 it is safe to take as the new candidate value that
of the largest prepared ballot, which helps to establish Weak validity for intact sets.
I Lemma 11. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let b1 be the
largest ballot prepared by some node v1 at some moment in the execution. If all nodes are
honest, then some node v2 proposed b1.x.
Now we examine the liveness properties of non-blocking Byzantine consensus in §3, which
ASCP also meets. Recall from §4 the bounded interval δI that a node in an intact set I
takes to deliver some Boolean for a given ballot, provided that some other node in I has
already delivered a Boolean for the same ballot. Let v be a node in I that prepares some
ballot b such that no other node in I has ever prepared a ballot with round bigger or equal
than b.n. We call the interval of duration δI after v prepares b the window for intact set I of
round b.n. Lemma 12 below guarantees that after some moment in the execution, no two
consecutive windows ever overlap.
I Lemma 12. Let S be an FBQS and consider an execution of ASCP over S. Let I be an
intact set in S and assume that all faulty nodes eventually stop. There exists a round n such
that either every node in I decides some value before reaching round n, or otherwise the
windows for I of all the rounds m ≥ n never overlap with each other, and in each window of
round m the nodes in I that have not decided yet only prepare ballots with round m.
Lemma 12 helps to establish Non-blocking for intact sets as follows. After the moment where
no two consecutive windows overlap, either every node in I has the same candidate ballot at
the beginning of the window of some round, or otherwise the highest ballots prepared by
each node in I during that window coincide with each other. In either case all the nodes in I
will eventually have the same candidate ballot, and they will decide a value in bounded time.
Correctness of ASCP is captured by Theorem 13 below:
I Theorem 13. Let S be an FBQS. The ASCP protocol over S satisfies the specification of
non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
6 Concrete Stellar Consensus Protocol
In this section we introduce concrete SCP (CSCP) which is amenable to implementation
because each node v maintains finite state and only needs to send and receive a finite number
of messages in order to progress. CSCP relies on bunched voting (BV ) in Algorithm 3, which
generalises FV and embodies all of FV’s instances for each of the ballots. CSCP considers a
single instance of BV, and thus each node v keeps a single process bunched-voting(v) (line 2
of Algorithm 4). In BV, nodes exchange messages that contain two kinds of statements: a
prepare statement prep b encodes the aim to abort the possibly infinite range of ballots
that are lower and incompatible than b; and a commit statement cmt b encodes the aim to
commit ballot b.
Algorithm 3 depicts BV over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q. A node v stores the
highest ballot for which v has respectively voted, readied, or delivered a prepare statement
in fields max-voted-prep, max-readied-prep, and max-delivered-prep (line 2). It also stores the
set of ballots for which v has respectively voted, readied, or delivered a commit statement
in fields ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt, and ballots-delivered-cmt (line 3). All these
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Algorithm 3 Bunched voting (BV) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process bunched-voting(v ∈ V)
2 max-voted-prep,max-readied-prep,max-delivered-prep← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
3 ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt, ballots-delivered-cmt← ∅ ∈ 2Ballot;
4 prepare(b)
5 if max-voted-prep < b then
6 max-voted-prep← b;
7 send VOTE(prep max-voted-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
8 when exists maximum b such that max-voted-prep < b and exists U ∈ Q
such that v ∈ U and for every u ∈ U received VOTE(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b
9 max-readied-prep← b ;
10 send READY(prep max-readied-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
11 when exists maximum b such that max-readied-prep < b and exists
v-blocking B such that for every u ∈ B received READY(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b
12 max-readied-prep← b ;
13 send READY(prep max-readied-prep) to every v′ ∈ V;
14 when exists maximum b such that max-delivered-prep < b and exists U ∈ Q
such that v ∈ U and for every u ∈ U received READY(prep bu) where
b′  bu for every b′  b
15 max-delivered-prep← b;
16 prepared(max-delivered-prep);
17 commit(b)
18 if b 6∈ ballots-voted-cmt and max-voted-prep = b then
19 ballots-voted-cmt← ballots-voted-cmt ∪ {b};
20 send VOTE(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
21 when received VOTE(cmt b) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and b 6∈ ballots-readied-cmt
22 ballots-readied-cmt← ballots-readied-cmt ∪ {b} ;
23 send READY(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
24 when received READY(cmt b) from every u ∈ B for some v-blocking B and
b 6∈ ballots-readied-cmt
25 ballots-readied-cmt← ballots-readied-cmt ∪ {b} ;
26 send READY(cmt b) to every v′ ∈ V ;
27 when received READY(cmt b) from every u ∈ U for some U ∈ Q such that
v ∈ U and b 6∈ ballots-delivered-cmt
28 ballots-delivered-cmt← ballots-delivered-cmt ∪ {b};
29 committed(b) ;
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fields are finite and thus v maintains only finite state. When a node v invokes prepare(b),
if b exceeds the highest ballot for which v has voted a prepare, then the node updates
max-voted-prep to b and sends VOTE(prep b) to every other node (lines 4–7). The protocol
then proceeds with the usual stages of FV, with the caveat that at each stage of the protocol
only the maximum ballot is considered for which the node can send a message – or deliver an
indication – with a prepare statement. In particular, when there exists a ballot b that exceeds
max-readied-prep and such that v received a message VOTE(prep bu) from each member u of
some quorum to which v belongs, then the node proceeds as follows: it checks that each b′
lower and incompatible than bu is also lower and incompatible than b (line 8). If b is the
maximum ballot passing the previous check for every member u of the quorum, then the
node updates the field max-readied-prep to b and sends the message READY(prep b) to every
other node (lines 9–10). The node v checks similar conditions for the case when it receives
messages READY(prep bu) from each member u of a v-blocking set, and proceeds similarly by
updating max-readied-prep to b and sending READY(prep b) to every other node (lines 11–13).
The node will update max-delivered-prep and trigger the indication prepared(b) when the
same conditions are met after receiving messages READY(prep bu) from each member u of
a quorum to which v belongs (lines 14–16). When a node v invokes commit(b) then the
protocol proceeds with the usual stages of FV with two minor differences (lines 17–29).
First, a node v only votes commit for the highest ballot for which v has voted a prepare
statement (condition max-voted-prep = b in line 18). Second, the protocol uses the sets of
ballots ballots-voted-cmt, ballots-readied-cmt and ballots-delivered-cmt in order to keep track
of the stage of the protocol for each ballot.
The structure of CSCP in Algorithm 4 directly relates to ASCP in Algorithm 2. A node
proposes a value x in line 5. A node tries to prepare a ballot b by invoking prepare(b) in
line 7, and receives the indication prepared(b) in line 8. A node tries to commit a ballot b by
invoking commit(b) in line 12, and receives the indication committed(b) in line 13. A node
decides a value x in line 14. Timeouts are set in lines 15–17 and triggered in line 18.
Next we establish a correspondence between CSCP in and ASCP in §5: the concrete
protocol observationally refines the abstract one, which means that any externally observable
behaviour of the former can also be produced by the latter [6]. Informally, the refinement
shows that for an FBQS S and an intact set I, for every execution of CSCP over S there
exists an execution of ASCP over S (with some behaviour of faulty nodes) such that each
node in I decides the same value in both of the executions. The refinement result allows us
to carry over the correctness of ASCP established in §5 to CSCP.
We first define several notions required to formalise our refinement result. A history is
a sequence of the events v.propose(x) and v.decide(x), where v is a correct node and x a
value. The specification of consensus assumes that v triggers an event v.propose(x), thus a
history will have v.propose(x) for every correct node v. A concrete trace τ is a sequence of
events that subsumes histories, and contains events v.prepare(b), v.commit(b), v.prepared(b),
v.committed(b), v.start-timer(n), v.timeout, v.send(m, v′), and v.receive(m, v′), where v is
a correct node and v′ is any node, b is a ballot, m is a message in {VOTE(s), READY(s)}
with s a statement in {prep b,cmt b}, and n is a round. An abstract trace τ is a se-
quence of events that subsumes histories, and contains events v.start-timer(n), v.timeout,
and batched events v.vote-batch([bi], a), v.deliver-batch([bi], a), v.send-batch([mi], v′), and
v.receive-batch([mi], v′),where v is a correct node and v′ is any node, n is a round, [bi] is a se-
quence of ballots, a is a Boolean, and [mi] is a sequence of messages in {VOTE(b, a), READY(b, a)}.
The sequences of ballots and messages above, which represent a possibly infinite number of
“batched” events, ensure that the length of any abstract trace is bounded by ω. We may
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Algorithm 4 Concrete SCP (CSCP) over an FBQS S with set of quorums Q.
1 process concrete-consensus(v ∈ V)
2 brs← new process bunched-voting(v);
3 candidate, prepared← 〈0,⊥〉 ∈ Ballot;
4 round← 0 ∈ N+ ∪ {0};
5 propose(x)
6 candidate← 〈1, x〉;
7 brs.prepare(candidate);
8 when triggered brs.prepared(b) and prepared < b
9 prepared← b;
10 if candidate ≤ prepared then
11 candidate← prepared;
12 brs.commit(candidate);
13 when triggered brs.committed(b)
14 trigger decide(b.x);
15 when exists U ∈ Q such that v ∈ U and for each u ∈ U exist
Mu ∈ {VOTE, READY} and bu ∈ Ballot such that round < bu.n and received
Mu(su bu) from u with su ∈ {cmt,prep}
16 round← min{bu.n | u ∈ U};
17 start-timer(F (round));
18 when triggered timeout
19 if prepared = 〈0,⊥〉 then candidate← 〈round + 1, candidate.x〉;
20 else candidate← 〈round + 1, prepared.x〉;
21 brs.prepare(candidate);
omit the adjective “concrete/abstract” from “trace” when it is clear from the context. Given
a trace τ , a history H(τ) can be uniquely obtained from τ by removing every event in τ
different from v.propose(x) or v.decide(x).
An execution of CSCP (respectively, ASCP) entails a concrete trace (respectively, abstract
trace) τ iff for every invocation and indication as well as for every send or receive primitive
in an execution of the protocol in Algorithm 4 (respectively, for every invocation, indication
and primitive in an execution of the protocol in Algorithm 2, where the vote, deliver, send
and receive events are batched together), τ contains corresponding events in the same order.
We are interested in traces that are relative to some intact set I. Given a trace τ , the
I-projected trace τ |I is obtained by removing the events v.ev ∈ τ such that v 6∈ I.
I Theorem 14. Let S be an FBQS and I be an intact set. For every execution of CSCP over
S with trace τ , there exists an execution of ASCP over S with trace ρ and H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I).
Proof sketch. We define a simulation function σ from concrete to abstract traces. The-
orem 14 can be established by showing that, for every finite prefix τ of a trace entailed by
CSCP, the simulation σ(τ) is a prefix of a trace entailed by ASCP. J
Every execution of ASCP enjoys the properties of Integrity, Agreement for intact sets,
Weak validity for intact sets and Non-blocking for intact sets, and so does every execution of
CSCP by refinement.
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I Corollary 15. Let S be an FBQS. The CSCP protocol over S satisfies the specification of
non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
7 Lying about Quorum Slices
So far we have assumed the unrealistic setting where faulty nodes do not equivocate their
quorum slices, so all nodes share the same FBQS S. We now lift this assumption. To this
end, we use a generalisation of FBQS called subjective FBQS [7], which allows faulty nodes
to lie about their quorum slices. Assuming that Vok is the set of correct nodes, the subjective
FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok is an indexed family of FBQSes where the different FBQSes agree on the
quorum slices of correct nodes, i.e., ∀v1, v2, v ∈ Vok. Sv1(v) = Sv2(v). For each correct
node v, the FBQS Sv is the view of node v, which reflects the choices of trust communicated
to v. We can run either ASCP or CSCP over a subjective FBQS {Sv}v∈Vok by letting each
correct node v act according to its view Sv.
We generalise the definition of intact set to subjective FBQSes, and we lift our results so
far to the subjective FBQSes. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. A set I is an intact set
iff for each v ∈ Vok the set I is a quorum in Sv that only contains correct nodes, and every
member of I is intertwined with each other in the projected FBQS Sv|I .
I Lemma 16. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. For any node v ∈ Vok, a set I is an
intact set in Sv iff I is an intact set in {Sv}v∈Vok .
Since Lemma 16 above guarantees that every view has the same intact sets, which also
coincide with the intact sets of the subjective FBQS, from now on we may say “an intact
set I” and omit to which system (a particular view, or the subjective FBQS) I belongs .
Using the fact that nodes agree on the slices of correct nodes, we can prove Lemma 17
below, which is the analogue to Lemma 3 and states sufficient safety conditions for the nodes
in an intact set I to reach agreement when each node acts according to its own view.
I Lemma 17. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and for each correct node v let Qv be
the set of quorums in the view Sv. Let I be an intact set and consider two quorums U1 and
U2 in
⋃
v∈Vok Qv. If U1 ∩ I 6= ∅ and U2 ∩ I 6= ∅, then U1 ∩ U2 ∩ I 6= ∅.
Using arguments similar to those in the previous sections, we can establish the correctness
of ASCP and CSCP over subjective FBQSes.
I Theorem 18. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. The ASCP protocol over {Sv}v∈Vok
satisfies the specification of non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
I Theorem 19. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS and I be an intact set. For every
execution of CSCP over {Sv}v∈Vok with trace τ , there exists an execution of ASCP over
{Sv}v∈Vok with trace ρ and H(τ |I) = H(ρ|I).
I Corollary 20. Let {Sv}v∈Vok be a subjective FBQS. The CSCP protocol over {Sv}v∈Vok
satisfies the specification of non-blocking Byzantine consensus for intact sets.
8 Related Work
García-Pérez and Gotsman [7] have previously investigated Stellar’s federated voting and its
relationship to Bracha’s broadcast over classical Byzantine quorum systems. They did not
address the full Stellar consensus protocol. Our proof of SCP establishes the correctness of
federated voting by adjusting the results in [7] to multiple intact sets within the system.
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Losa et al. [10] have also investigated consensus over FBQSs. They propose a generalisation
of Stellar’s quorums that does not prescribe constructing them from slices, yet allows different
participants to disagree on what constitutes a quorum. They then propose a protocol solving
consensus over intact sets in this setting that provides better liveness guarantees than SCP,
but is impractical. Losa et al.’s work is orthogonal to ours: they consider a more general
setting than Stellar’s and a theoretical protocol, whereas we investigate the practical protocol
used by Stellar.
The advent of blockchain has given rise to a number of novel proposals of BFT protocols;
see [3] for a survey. Out of these, the most similar one to Stellar is Ripple [15]. In particular,
Ripple have recently proposed a protocol called Cobalt that allows for a federated setting
similar to Stellar’s [11]. We hope that our work will pave the way to investigating the
correctness of this and similar protocols.
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